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This paper analyzes the recent trend toward physician unioni-
zation from an antitrust perspective. Section I chronicles significant
developments in the physician unionization movement, and suggests
underlying perceptions of the market as possible impetuses. Section
II explores the relationship of antitrust law to unionization in general
and to physician unionization more specifically. Section III examines
House Bill 13041 as a model for physician unionization and criticizes
various policy justifications of the bill. Section IV proposes physician
network joint ventures and monopsony2 regulation as two alternative
antitrust strategies. Finally, the conclusion summarizes the various
arguments against physician unionization.
I. THE RISE OF PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION AND PERCEPTIONS OF
AN UNLEVEL PLAYING FIELD
Although the phenomenon of physician unionization is by no
means novel,3 changes in the health care industry have rekindled
interest in and debates over the legality, legitimacy, and consequences
of this practice. Recent statistics indicate that about six percent of all
U.S. physicians belong to a union. 4 In absolute numbers, this means
* J.D., University of North Carolina, 2000. The author wishes to thank Professors
Marion G. Crain and John F. Graybeal for their advice and direction, and Ms. Nina Francesca
Raba for her constant support, encouragement and inspiration.
1. H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. (1999). For more detailed discussion of H.R. 1304, see infra
notes 70-86 and accompanying text.
2. A monopsony is a market situation in which one buyer exerts a disproportionate
influence on the market. WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 768, 822 (1983).
3. For a history of the physician unionization movement, see generally GRACE BUDRYS,
WHEN DOCTORS JOIN UNIONS (1997).
4. See Ed Egger, If Physician Unionization Trend Catches On, Hospitals Could Be
Drastically Affected, HEALTH CARE STRATEGIC MGMT., Sept. 1, 1999, at 10; see also In the
News: More Physicians Join Unions, REHAB REP., Aug. 24, 1999 (predicting fifteen percent
annual increases in physician union participation in the near future).
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that between 45,000 and 50,000 of the 737,000 licensed physicians
have signed a union card.5 Furthermore, this number is steadily
rising.6
This current trend toward physician unionization is most
poignantly evidenced by the June 1999 reversal of the American
Medical Association's (AMA's) long-standing position against
unionization.7 Despite a history of staunch union opposition,8 on
June 23, 1999, the AMA's Board of Trustees voted to establish its
own union.9 With the endorsement of an association as catholic and
prestigious as the AMA, physician unionization has shed its image as
an unorthodox practice 0 and emerged as a mainstream solution to
perceived problems in the health care industry.
As this growing direction in health care has gained public
attention, Congress has also taken notice. In 1998 and 1999, Cali-
fornia Representative Thomas Campbell sponsored legislation that
would immunize physician unionization from antitrust laws.
Specifically, House Bill 130412 proposes to exempt negotiations
among health care professionals from antitrust law in the same way
the collective bargaining of labor unions under the National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) is exempted. 13 Since the House Judiciary
Committee recently approved the bill, its prospects of winning a vote
on the House floor have grown.'4 Although similar success on the
5. See Tom Abate, Doctors Examine Union Option: Physicians Are Beginning to Band
Together-and HMOs Are Worried, THE SAN FRANCISCO CHRON., Sept. 3, 1999, at Cl;
Elizabeth Neus, Doctors Who Want to Unionize Face Legal, Logistical Obstacles, GANNETT
NEWS SERVICE, Oct. 1, 1999, available at 1999 WL 6975379.
6. See Egger, supra note 4, at 10.
7. See AMA: Unprecedented Vote to Create Doctor's Union, AM. HEALTH LINE, June 24,
1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, HLTLNE File [herinafter AMA: Unprecedented Vote].
Founded over 150 years ago, the AMA is an organization of nearly 300,000 physicians dedicated
to the promotion of "the science and art of medicine and the betterment of public health."
AMA -Home (visited Nov. 4, 1999) <http://www.ama-assn.org/about/purpose.htm>.
8. A self-proclaimed "voice and influential advocate for patients and physicians," the
AMA historically opposed physician unionization, arguing that the economic agenda of a union
would be detrimental to physicians' professional obligations to public welfare. Id; see also
BUDRYS, supra note 3, at 87-88. Indeed, the AMA was so resolute in its antiunion position that
in 1989 it solicited the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) to investigate the antitrust implications
of one physician union's collective bargaining activity. See id. at 90.
9. See AMA Backs Formation of Union, MED. INDUSTRY TODAY, June 24,1999, available
at LEXIS, News Library, MEDTDY File. According to AMA Board of Trustees Chairman Dr.
Randolph D. Smoak, Jr., the union will "give America's physicians the leverage they now lack
to guarantee that patient care is not compromised or neglected for the sake of profits." Id.
10. See BUDRYS, supra note 3, at 15-16.
11. See H.R. 1304,106th Cong. (1999); H.R. 4277, 105th Cong. (1998).
12. H.R. 1304.
13. See id.
14. See 146 Cong. Rec. D292-01, 294 (Mar. 30, 2000). Compare Sarah A. Klein, Physician
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Senate floor is unlikely,15 a dramatic increase in congressional
cosponsorship of the bill is a good indication that popularity for the
bill is burgeoning.16
This recent wave of interest in unionization is fueled largely by
changes in the way Americans receive their health care since the
incipience of managed care organizations (MCOs). 17 MCOs are third-
party payers that "attempt to achieve economic efficiencies by
providing financial incentives for health care providers and
implementing case control management and utilization review." 18
Before MCOs, patients received medical care paid for on a "fee-for-
service" basis by employers or private insurers.19 As such, third-party
payers had little control over either the costs of care or the decisions
regarding treatments. 20 To contain costs, however, MCOs implement
highly regimented processes for determining the appropriate costs
and courses of medical services. 21 This change in health care access
and payment has also changed the way U.S. physicians do business,
resulting in a sharp increase in the number of physician-MCO
contracts.22
Antitrust Bill Pronounced Dead for Now, AM. MED. NEWS, Nov. 8, 1999, at 5; Bill Number H.R.
1304 106th Cong. 1st Sess., LEXIS Congressional Bills Legislative Forecasts-Current Congress
(1998) (projecting that H.R. 1304 has a sixteen percent and four percent chance of passing the
House and Senate Committee level, respectively; and a fifteen percent and four percent chance
of passing the House and Senate Floor, respectively), with Westlaw BILLCAST-106th Congress
(Apr. 2000) (giving H.R. 1304 a ninety-four percent chance of passing a vote on the House
floor).
15. See 146 Cong. Rec. D292-01, 294 (Mar. 30, 2000) (giving H.R. 1304 only a twenty-five
percent chance of success should it reach the Senate floor).
16. While its 1998 predecessor could only accumulate the co-sponsorship of four represen-
tatives, H.R. 1304 has amassed a remarkably bipartisan cosponsorship of 212 representatives.
Compare Bill Summary & Status (H.R. 4277) (visited Oct. 25, 1999) <http://thomas.loc.gov/>,
with Bill Tracking Report H.R. 1304,1999 LEXIS Bill Tracking H.R. 1304 (last updated Apr. 14,
2000) (listing the 122 Democrat and eighty-eight Republican cosponsors of H.R. 1304).
17. For the purposes of this Note, the term "managed care organization" refers to the
many forms assumed by health care insurers, including HMOs, PPOs and other similar plans.
See, e.g., Ellen L. Luepke, White Coat, Blue Collar: Physician Unionization and Managed Care,
8 ANN. HEALTH L. 275,276 n.5 (1999) (using "MCO" to refer generally to all types of managed
care firms). Statistics indicate an increase in the presence of MCOs in recent years. For
example, between 1976 and 1995, national MCO enrollment increased from 6 million to 51
million. See Mary Guptill Warren et al., The Impact of Managed Care on Physicians, HEALTH
CARE MGMT. REv., Spring 1999, at 44 (citing GROUP HEALTH ASS'N OF AMERICA, NATIONAL
DIRECTORY OF HMOS WASHINGTON, D.C.: GROUP HEALTH ASS'N OF AMERICA). During the
same period, MCOs increased in number from 175 to 591 nationwide. See id.
18. Luepke, supra note 17, at 276.
19. See id. at 275
20. See id. at 275-76.
21. See id. at 276-77.
22. See Warren et al., supra note 17, at 44. ("[Bletween 1988 and 1993, the percentage of
physicians with any managed care contracts increased from 61 percent to 75 percent."); see also
Bruce H. Drukker, M.D., Envelopes: Presidential Address, 179 AM. J. OBSTETRICS &
20001
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Despite increasing enrollment statistics, 3 consumers generally
are dissatisfied with services that MCOs provide and perceive a
deterioration in the overall quality of health care. A recent Kaiser-
Harvard survey indicates that many patients believe that MCOs have
reduced the amount of time doctors spend with patients, made it
harder for sick patients to see specialists, and lowered the quality of
health care.24 A 1997 Louis Harris & Associates poll also found that
consumers rated MCOs next to last (above only tobacco companies)
in customer service. 25
With the influx of managed care, physicians also have become
increasingly frustrated by the resulting lack of professional autonomy
and perceived hindrance on the quality of care. One study indicates
that, as MCO participation increases, "physicians are less likely to
believe that third-party payers don't affect treatment, and more likely
to believe that they must sometimes ignore their clinical judgment,
that managed care has increased their use of diagnostic tests, and that
managed care has changed the individual physicians to whom they
refer.''1 6  Specifically, MCOs threaten physician autonomy by
influencing physician behavior. According to another study, MCOs
influence physician behavior by implementing certain financial
incentives; administrative or management strategies (including utili-
zation review, referral requirements, and sanctioning); structural
characteristics (including practice site, service availability, staffing
patterns, and governance); and information or normative influences
(including professional culture and institutional practices such as
education and feedback).27
GYNECOLOGY 1400, 1400 (1998) ("With about 600 managed care operations in the United
States, physicians can no longer afford to sit in the stands and just watch the play on the field.
Participation is crucial and must be accompanied by additional learning, such as masters degrees
in business administration or MBAs."); Jerome P. Kassirer, Doctor Discontent, 339 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1543, 1543-44 (1998) ("Some physicians are attempting to meet the challenge of the new
economics of practice head-on. They have tried to master bookkeeping and accounting skills
and, working in groups, have been aggressively negotiating contracts and fees with multiple
insurers.").
23. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
24. See Drukker, supra note 22, at 1402. Kaiser Family Foundation President Drew E.
Altman, Ph.D., stated that, "[m]anaged care is winning in the marketplace but is in danger of
losing in the battle of public opinion." Id.
25. See id.
26. Warren et al., supra note 17, at 55.
27. See Bruce E. Landon, M.D., M.B.A., et al., A Conceptual Model of the Effects of Health
Care Organizations on the Quality of Medical Care, 279 JAMA 1377, 1379-80 (1998); see also
Kevin Grumbach et al., Primary Care Physicians' Experience of Financial Incentives in
Managed-Care Systems, 339 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1516, 1516 (Nov. 19, 1998) (analyzing a study on
the prevalence MCO financial incentives and their influence on primary care practice).
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Many physicians argue that MCOs restrict patient access to
quality medical care in an effort to cut costs.28 So upset are physicians
that many condone lying to MCOs in order to obtain authorization
for certain medical procedures, according to a recent study.29 The
study found a tension between a physician's "traditional ethic of
patient advocacy and the new ethic of cost control that restricts
patient and physician choice in the use of... resources. ' 30  This
tension especially was demonstrated by an increased willingness to
use deception among physicians who practiced in markets with high
concentrations of MCOs.31
More cynical critics suggest that physician frustration with the
managed care system may be rooted more in the self-interested desire
for higher earnings than in the professional pursuit of autonomy or
quality health care.32  Statistics documenting a slowdown in the
average earnings of U.S. physicians could give rise to such suspicions.
A recent AMA survey indicates that the average earnings of U.S.
physicians increased a meager 0.3% between 1996 and 1997. 33 In
contrast, average earnings increased at about ten percent per year
before the current managed care regime.34
Whether or not a recession in physician earnings is motivating
28. See, e.g., John P. Little, D.M.D., Managed Care Contracts of Adhesion: Terminating the
Doctor-Patient Relationship and Endangering Patient Health, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 1397, 1400-
02 (1997).
MCOs directly restrict care by retaining the final decision on whether to authorize
benefits for medical care, such as hospital admissions, referrals to specialists, and
access to medical tests. Many MCOs indirectly restrict access to care by imposing a
system of financial penalties and bonuses on physicians in order to induce them to
provide as little patient care as possible. The aggressive use of these policies has led to
patient deaths and bitter disputes when MCOs [refuse] to authorize or have delayed
approving benefits for necessary medical care.
Id.
29. See Victor G. Freeman, M.D., et al., Lying for Patients: Physician Deception of Third-
Party Payers, 159 ARCHIVES INTERNAL MED. 2263 (Oct. 25, 1999) <http://archinte.ama-
assn.org/issues/v159nl9/full/ioi8l370.html>.
30. Id.
31. See id. at 2269.
32. Edward O'Neill of the Center for the Health Professions at the University of California
at San Francisco comments that although "[u]nionization is being positioned as a patient-care
issue .... [iut is motivated out of economic issues." Abate, supra note 5, at C1. Professor
Howard Berliner of the New York School for Social Research adds, "I don't really think this is
being done for patients. This is happening because doctors' incomes, doctors' sense of
autonomy, are getting killed." AMA: Unprecedented Vote, supra note 7. Noting the AMA's
estimation that physicians enjoy a median annual income of $164,000, critics in the insurance
industry charge physician unions with merely attempting to pad "already cushy salaries." Jodie
Morse, Unionizing the E.R.: To Combat Managed Care, Doctors Want to Organize, but It's No
Magic Elixir, TIME, July 5, 1999, at 62.




the physician unionization movement, the following is clear: many
physicians attribute a deterioration in the quality of health care and
an economic slump for physicians to an unequal bargaining power
enjoyed by many consolidated MCOs. The AMA blames the high
market concentration of such health plans for restraining the ability
of physicians to negotiate health plan contract terms that adequately
ensure quality care.35 According to the AMA, MCOs use the
leverage gained from monopsonizing the demand for medical services
to dictate contractual terms. 6 The result, it argues, is a "take it or
leave it" contract that forces physicians to provide lower quality care
by narrowly defining "medical necessity, ' 37 implementing patient
quotas,3 8 or reducing reimbursement rates.3
9
Still others suggest that any reduction in physician earnings (or
attendant decline in the quality of care) may be attributable to an
over supply of medical professionals. Between 1970 and 1990, the
number of physicians in the U.S. whose primary activity was patient
care increased from 115 to 182 per 100,000 population.4° While the
market absorbed this increase in supply without depressing physician
incomes,'41 subsequent increases in the supply of physicians may have
had a different effect. Indeed, studies project that in the year 2000
U.S. health care markets will have a physician surplus amounting to
thirty percent of the 571,000 patient care physicians nationally.42 With
multiple applicants for every position in medical school, this glut in
supply shows no signs of waning.43 Basic economics suggests that,
without any change in demand, this increase in the supply of health
care professionals will result in lower prices for their services. 44
35. See Quality Health Care Coalition Act of 1999: Hearings on H.R. 1304 Before the House
Comm. on the Jud., 106th Cong. (1999) [hereinafter Hearings] (statement of the AMA).
36. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 151 (statement of the AMA).
37. Id.
3& See AMA Backs Formation of Union, supra note 9.
39. See infra note 68 and accompanying text (describing the FTC response to physician
attempts to collectively negotiate higher reimbursement rates).




43. See Itzhak Jacoby, Ph.D., & Gregg Meyer, M.D., Creating an Effective Physician
Workforce Marketplace, 280 JAMA 822 (1998).
44. Furthermore, Dr. Uwe Reinhardt of Princeton University reminds physicians that
unionization efforts to raise reimbursement rates could actually exacerbate the effects of a high
supply as "the number of professionals society wishes to employ in any given year... will
decrease if they insist on higher annual incomes." See Reinhardt, supra note 40, at 69.
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II. ANTITRUST BARRIERS TO PHYSICIAN UNIONIZATION
To fully appreciate the antitrust concerns raised by physician
unionization in particular, an examination of the economic
consequences of unionization in general is essential. In common
parlance the terms "union" and "unionization" refer to labor unions
and the process of organizing employees into unions under federal
labor laws.45 For the purposes of this Section, however, these terms
refer to the collective organization of independent individuals,
regardless of the applicability of labor law. As explained more fully
below, an antitrust exemption immunizes many labor union practices
from liability.4 6 Where federal labor law does not govern a "union,"
however, no such immunity exists. In light of this framework, this
Section begins by addressing the economic effects of unionization
without regard to antitrust laws or exemptions. Next, this Section
explains the nature of the labor exemption to the antitrust laws.
Finally, this Section examines the particular antitrust law problems
posed by physician unionization.
A. The Economic Effects of Unionization
A "union" is defined as "a confederation or league of
independent individuals.., for some common end or purpose. '47
Where unions are formed "horizontally" (that is, among parties who
otherwise compete for limited resources such as market share, jobs,
or contracts), the "common end or purpose" toward which union
participants endeavor likely will be mutually favorable terms for
procurement of economic resources. For example, a hypothetical
labor union, though comprised of employees who would otherwise
compete for jobs, may negotiate higher wages or more favorable
working conditions for its members. In short, market competition is
supplanted by cooperation among the members. Furthermore, if the
union is successful in its use of cooperative bargaining power, future
competition among the parties will be discouraged.48
In stark contrast to this milieu of cooperation, antitrust policy
stands predicated on the assumption that competition produces the
most efficient allocation of economic resources and facilitates
45. See, e.g., NLRA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 et seq. (1994).
46. See infra notes 52-60 and accompanying text.
47. WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 2499 (1993).
48. See Jason E. Whitehead, The Labor Exemption from Antitrust As an Ideological
Antinomy, 32 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 881, 901 (1996).
20001
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innovation in the development of products and services.4 1 Under such
a rubric of analysis, threats to a competitive model directly result in
adverse effects for consumers. Accordingly, antitrust policy seeks to
police actions that threaten competition like collusion among actors
within a marketplace. 0  Therefore, the procompetitive goals of
antitrust policy and the procooperative goals of unions set the stage
for what one critic terms an "ideological impasse."51
B. The Labor Exemption to Antitrust Law
In the special case of labor unions, this "ideological impasse" has
been resolved in favor of an antitrust exemption for organized labor.
Labor unions derive their antitrust immunity from a number of
different sources both nonstatutory and statutory.52 The most patent
statutory exemption is found in section 6 of the Clayton Act. 3 This
section has been interpreted to exempt labor unions acting in their
own self-interest from antitrust scrutiny." United Mine Workers v.
Pennington,5 5 a case involving union collective bargaining attempts
with coal mining firms, illustrated the nonstatutory exemption.
Ostensibly, labor exemptions operate by removing human labor from
the scope of commodities and articles of commerce to which antitrust
laws apply.56 Other critics, however, characterize these exemptions as
a means of offsetting the employer's monopsony power57 over the
labor market with a countervailing monopoly power.5 8
Regardless of the theoretical roots of the labor exemption,
however, certain practical limitations to the exemption exist. As
interpreted, the labor exemptions have been restricted to unions
acting in their own interest, unions using the least restrictive means
available to achieve their objective, unions involving an employer-
employee (rather than independent contractor) relationship, and
49. See 2A PHILLIP AREEDA, ANTITRUST LAW 401 (1995).
50. See id. 1 415.
51. See Whitehead, supra note 48, at 901.
52. See AREEDA, supra note 49, at 1$ 255-57.
53. See Clayton Act § 6, 15 U.S.C. § 17 (1994).
54. See, e.g., United States v. Hutcheson, 312 U.S. 219, 234 (1941).
55. 381 U.S. 657 (1965).
56. See Clayton Act § 6.
57. For a discussion of monopsony power, see generally ROGER D. BLAIR & JEFFREY L.
HARRISON, MONOPSONY: ANTITRUST LAW AND ECONOMICS (1993).
58. See, e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, Redefining the Antitrust Labor Exemption, 72 MINN. L.
REV. 1379, 1402-03 (1988). For an explanation of the countervailing power argument, see J.K.
GALBRAITH, AMERICAN CAPITALISM: THE CONCEPT OF COUNTERVAILING POWER (1952).
[Vol. 76:1303
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unions acting in an official capacity. 59 To the extent that the statutory
exemption applies to union activity, the NLRA further defines the
statutory exemption and provides for the adjudication of applicable
issues.
60
C. Problems with Physician Unionization under Antitrust Law
These labor exemptions, however, do not apply to most unions of
physicians. In fact, most physician unions fail to qualify because they
are considered groups of independent contractors rather than
employees. 61 This disqualification has frustrated many physicians in
light of recent trends toward condoning the union activity of other,
less traditional laborers including professional athletes, musicians,
actors, and movie directors.
62
Without an applicable exemption, the anticompetitive effects of a
physician union may be scrutinized under specific antitrust laws.
While a physician union's potential to engage in horizontal price-
fixing would be the most blatant affront to antitrust law,63 the
potential to engage in refusals to deal with MCOs,64 internal restraints
on advertising or practice, 65 or information sharing 6 could also reduce
competition by stabilizing prices. When horizontal unions collaborate
to stabilize or even fix prices within a market (as many physician
unions propose to do through the collective negotiation of MCO
59. See E. THOMAS SULLIVAN & JEFFREY L. HARRISON, UNDERSTANDING ANTITRUST
AND ITS ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS 78-80 (3d ed. 1998).
60. See Luepke, supra note 17, at 282 (citing NLRA § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1935)).
61. See BUDRYS, supra note 3, at 116-18; see also Luepke, supra note 17, at 290. House Bill
1304 of 1999 expressly addresses this dilemma for physician unions. The bill states that a health
care professional negotiating under the Act shall "be treated as an employee engaged in
concerted activities and shall not be regarded as having the status of an employer, independent
contractor, managerial employee, or supervisor." H.R. 1304 § 3(a), 106th Cong. (2000).
62. See BUDRYS, supra note 3, at 117 (quoting Sanford Marcus, A Proposal for the Defense
of the American Medical Profession, J. MIAMI MED., Feb. 1986, at 22); Hearings, supra note 35,
at 428 (statement of Michael P. Connair, M.D., Vice-President, Federation of Physicians and
Dentists).
63. See, e.g., United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 224 (1940) (holding
that price is the "central nervous system of the economy" and that agreements interfering "with
the setting of price by free market forces" are per se illegal).
64. See, e.g., FTC v. Indiana Federation of Dentists, 476 U.S. 447, 449 (1986) (finding a
section 1 violation where eighty-five percent of Indiana dentists refused to send x-rays with
health insurance claim forms).
65. See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (finding a violation where
a group of California dentists agreed to limit advertising on the basis of quality).
66. See, e.g., American Column & Lumber Co. v. United States, 257 U.S. 377, 411-12
(1921) (holding that a plan among competing firms in the American Hardwood Manufacturers'
Association to create a clearinghouse for sales, shipping, pricing, and production of product
information was illegal).
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reimbursement fees), union members violate section 1 of the Sher-
man Act, prohibiting "[e]very contract, combination in the form of
trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or com-
merce .... ,,67  Indeed, physician groups engaged in collective bar-
gaining have formed the basis of successful antitrust litigation.
6
III. THE DEBATE OVER AN ANTITRUST EXEMPTION FOR PHYSICIAN
UNIONS: HOUSE BILL 1304 OF 1999
H.R. 1304 has provided a crucible in which policy debates over
physician unionization have sparked. Proposing to provide physician
unions with NLRA antitrust immunity, the bill clearly subscribes to
the premise that physicians should be given a countervailing power
with which to negotiate MCO contracts. Indeed, findings appended
to the bill assert that the collective negotiation of physicians "will
create a more equal balance of negotiating power, will promote
competition, and will enhance the quality of patient care. '69 This
Section will discuss two issues raised in the debate over this
legislation: the very use of a countervailing force and the effect of
physician unionization on health care quality.70  Moreover, this
Section will present arguments against H.R. 1304 on the basis of both.
67. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1994).
68. See North Lake Tahoe Med. Group, Inc., No. C-3885, 1999 FTC LEXIS 134 (consent
order issued July 21, 1999, prohibiting an IPA of 91 California physicians representing seventy
percent of the physicians practicing in the Lake Tahoe area from engaging in collective
bargaining with third party payers, collectively refusing to deal with Blue Shield of California,
fixing prices, and restricting physician negotiations outside of the IPA); Mesa County Physicians
Independent Practice Ass'n, Inc., D-9284, 1999 FIC LEXIS 67 (consent order issued May 4,
1999) (stopping a Mesa County, Colorado IPA comprising eighty-five percent of all physicians
and ninety percent of primary care physicians in the relevant geographic market from fixing
prices, refusing to deal with third party payers, and otherwise "hindering the development of
alternative health care financing and delivery systems"); M.D. Physicians of Southwest
Louisiana Inc., C-3824, 1998 FTC LEXIS 89 (consent order issued Aug. 31, 1998, prohibiting a
Lake Charles, Louisiana physicians group from collective negotiations); Urological Stone
Surgeons, Inc., C-3791, 1998 FTC LEXIS 36 (consent order issued Apr. 10, 1998 forbidding a
group comprised of sixty-five percent of the urologists in the Chicago metropolitan area from
using a common billing agent as a vehicle for collective bargaining).
69. H.R. 1304 § 2(4), 106th Cong. (2000).
70. House Bill 1304 is also objectionable to the extent that it allows for physician strikes.
The prospect of an ill patient being refused treatment by striking physicians is certainly
disconcerting. It can be argued that the people society entrusts with an intellectual monopoly
on medical treatment have an ethical obligation to make their services available to those who
need them. The stakes are especially high when human health hangs in the balance.
Nevertheless, physician strikes are not unprecedented. On multiple occasions it has taken the
enforcement power of the FTC to put striking physicians back to work. See, e.g., Ernesto L.
Ramirez Torres, D.M.D., et al., C-3851, 1999 FTC LEXIS 16 (consent order issued Feb. 5, 1999,
prohibiting a group of Puerto Rican dentists from fixing prices and boycotting a government
program for indigent dental care after the dentists boycotted the program); College of
[Vol. 76:1303
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A. Addressing an Unlevel Playing Field with a Countervailing Force
The very idea that implementation of a countervailing force is an
appropriate way to respond to negotiating imbalances is itself a topic
of much debate. In a sense, this debate is an extrapolation of the
"ideological impasse" between labor law and antitrust law.71 The very
premise driving antitrust laws (that competition will yield the most
efficient allocation of economic resources) is theoretically incon-
sistent with the legislative remedy proposed in H.R. 1304.
Most supporters of H.R. 1304 point to grossly disparate bar-
gaining positions as necessitating a countervailing force. One phy-
sician claiming the necessity of a countervailing force justifies the
AMA position by analogizing the physician-MCO relationship to the
biblical story of David and Goliath. 7z  Another argues that MCOs
have forced physicians into working conditions best characterized as
"medical sweatshops." 73 Ultimately, the arguments of these physician
proponents of H.R. 1304 are self-defeating. While they complain of
Physicians-Surgeons of Puerto Rico, FTC File No. 9710011 (D.P.R. Oct. 2, 1997) (enjoining a
group of 8,000 Puerto Rican physicians from continuing its eight day strike on nonemergency
services, and ordering it to pay $300,000 in restitution to the Puerto Rico Department of
Health); Trauma Assoc. of N. Broward, Inc., 118 F.T.C. 1130 (1994) (consent order compelling
a group of ten Broward County, Florida surgeons to dissolve a corporation through which they
collectively negotiated reimbursement fees and contract terms after the group went on strike,
forcing a trauma center to close).
The bill ostensibly forecloses this possibility by expressly limiting its exemption so as not to
confer upon any health care professional the "right to participate in any collective cessation of
service to patients not otherwise permitted by law." H.R. 1304 § 3(c), 106th Cong. (2000). The
effect of this limitation, added to the bill since its introduction in the House Judiciary
Committee, is not certain. On one hand, this language appears to be clear in its proscription of
physician strikes. Accordingly, the bill's limitation could be read as removing only one of
myriad economic tools available to those who bargain collectively. On the other hand, the
limitation could render the legislative exemption entirely meaningless by removing the shadow
of a strike from MCO-physician union negotiations. Indeed, the ability of the NLRA to
facilitate negotiation between labor and management has hinged, theoretically and empirically,
on the underlying threat of a strike and its consequences to all parties involved. See, e.g.,
JULIUS G. GETMAN ET AL., LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS AND THE LAW 162-63 (2d ed.
1999).
Ultimately the threat of physician strikes may be mitigated from within the profession.
Despite past physician strikes, the AMA has assured the public that its physician union and
others like it will not strike. See Physician Unionization: AMA Vows No Strikes, Am. Health
Line, Oct. 12, 1999, available at LEXIS, News Library, HLTLNE File. Furthermore, the
findings introducing House Bill 1304 recognize that "[a]llowing health care professionals to
negotiate collectively with health care plans will not change the professionals' ethical duty to
continue to provide medically necessary care to their patients." H.R. 1304 § 2(5), 106th Cong.
(2000).
71. See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
72. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 152 (statement of the AMA).
73. Hearings, supra note 35, at 183 (testimony of Robert L. Weinmann, M.D., President,
Union of American Physicians and Dentists).
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unfettered MCO power, they propose for themselves a vehicle for
unchecked power as the best possible solution.
74
FFC Chairman Robert Pitofsky acknowledges that bargaining
imbalances certainly exist between solo practitioners and large
insurance companies.75 Such imbalances, he maintains, are common
features of our economy.76 Nevertheless, Pitofsky warns that "the
suggestion that [H.R. 1304] would not impose higher costs on
consumers and others-on the ground that the exemption would
merely create a countervailing monopoly-is premised on theoretical
arguments about market conditions that do not describe most health
care markets. '77 Largely for this reason, the agencies have resisted
physician attempts to create countervailing negotiating powers. 78
B. The Effect of Physician Unionization on the Quality of Health
Care
Many physicians attribute any perceived reduction in the overall
quality of health care to MCO reimbursement, treatment, and referral
policies. They argue that MCO contracts structurally discourage
patient care through financial terms and incentives.79  These argu-
ments may be best understood as a response to the "cost
containment" prerogative of managed care. MCOs have forfeited
quality in an attempt to achieve the lowest possible costs, according to
many physicians. 80 Managed care responds that by lowering the costs
of health care, MCOs enable employers to insure more people.81
Managed care further argues that MCO systems of selecting
74. The irony of this position is demonstrated in the statement of the AMA to the House
Committee on the Judiciary. The AMA complains that "it is not healthy for any group to have
virtually unlimited power over a matter as significant and sensitive as the kind of medical
treatment needed by an individual with an illness or injury. When that unlimited power exists, it
is inevitable that distortions will occur, and they are occurring." Hearings, supra note 35, at 151
(statement of the AMA). Although this statement beseeches heightened antitrust enforcement
of the health care industry, it supports an antitrust exemption. In short, the legislative solution
proposed by House Bill 1304 in fact facilitates unlimited bargaining power.
75. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 51 (statement of Robert Pitofsky, FTC Chairman).
76. See id.
77. Id.
78. See Robert Pitofsky, Thoughts on "Leveling the Playing Field" in Health Care Markets
(visited Apr. 13, 2000) <http://www.ftc.gov/speeches/pitofsky/nhla.htm> ("To the extent ... that
the level playing field argument is about creating a countervailing force in order to neutralize a
perceived imbalance in bargaining power, antitrust law will not be receptive.").
79. See Little, supra note 28, at 1411.
80. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 154 (statement of the AMA).
81. See Quality Health-Care Coalition Act of 1998: Hearings on H.R. 4277 Before the House
Comm. on the Jud., 105th Cong. (July 29, 1998) (testimony of Steven J. deMontmollin, Vice
President, AvMed Health Plan, on behalf of the American Association of Health Plans, Inc.).
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competent network providers, providing quality improvement
interventions, and conducting clinical accountability studies achieve
quality levels impossible under fee-for-service regimes.
82
The question of professional service quality is particularly
problematic. On one hand, professionals have a "monopoly" of
knowledge and skill gained through professional training that would
make them likely candidates to set standards of quality within their
respective professions. Conversely, the promulgation of professional
standards often results in higher prices for consumers and may,
therefore, restrain free competition. 83  Antitrust law reconciles this
dilemma by trusting the marketplace to insure professional quality.84
The assumption that competition in the market will insure
quality is complicated by certain conditions specific to the health care
financing industry. First of all, many managed care subscribers are
"one step removed" from the market insofar as a large percentage of
the insured population relies on employer-provided care.85  An
employer, as the surrogate purchaser on behalf of its employees, may
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., California Dental Ass'n v. FTC, 526 U.S. 756 (1999) (finding a violation where
a group of California dentists promulgated professional standards).
84. 'See Letter from Albert A. Foer, President of American Antitrust Institute & Matthew
D. Siegel, Research Fellow, American Antitrust Institute, to U.S. Congressman Henry Hyde,
Chairman, U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Judiciary (Oct. 10, 1999), available
at <http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/rec nt/45.cfm> ("[House Bill 1304] implicitly assumes that
health-care professionals are the best arbiters of health-care utilization levels. They are not.
Neither are insurers .... Only consumers themselves... can integrate information about
quality with information about cost, to select the preferred cost/quality balance."). In National
Society of Professional Engineers v. United States, the Supreme Court affirmed an injunction
nullifying a "code of ethics" for professional engineers promulgated by the petitioner. 435 U.S.
at 679 (1978). The facts of the case indicate that the code prohibited member engineers from
competing on price when bidding for jobs. See id. at 684. Petitioner defended its code, arguing
that competitive bidding would threaten public safety by tempting engineers to compromise
quality for profit. See id. at 685. Applying a rule of reason analysis, the Supreme Court rejected
this and any other defense "based on the assumption that competition itself is unreasonable."
Id. at 696. In so holding, the Supreme Court definitively addressed the relationship of
professional service quality to antitrust law:
The Sherman Act reflects a legislative judgment that ultimately competition will
produce not only lower prices, but also better goods and services .... The assumption
that competition is the best method of allocating resources in a free market recognizes
that all elements of a bargain-quality, service, safety, and durability-and not just the
immediate cost, are favorably affected by the free opportunity to select among
alternative offers. Even assuming occasional exceptions to the presumed conse-
quences of competition, the statutory policy precludes inquiry into the question of
whether competition is good or bad.
Id. at 695 (citations omitted).
85. See, e.g., Robert Kuttner, The American Health Care System -Employer-Sponsored
Health Coverage, 340 NEw ENG. J. MED. 248, 248 (1999) ("Most Americans rely on their
employers for health insurance."). But see Pitofsky, supra note 78, at 5 ("[S]ome employers are
experimenting with new ways to increase the role of informed choice by their employees.").
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have divergent interests with respect to cost and quality factors.
While employees may exert some influence over their employers'
decisions regarding health insurance, the employer-employee
dynamic certainly restrains the patient's participation in the market.
This effect is further exacerbated by the very nature of insurance.
Quality will be a more important factor for the minority of patients
with immediate medical needs than for those who merely pay a
premium in hopes of never needing acute medical attention.
Despite these market-specific conditions, the hypothesis that
competition will control the quality of health care applies none-
theless. As MCOs compete for employer contracts, employers also
must compete for labor. Employers that offer workers low-quality
health insurance will lose employees to firms providing superior
insurance. In turn, employers will demand that MCOs compete on
the basis of quality and offer a cost/quality balance that reflects
consumer demand.86
The nature of MCOs as insurance providers should not distort
the market's ability to regulate quality tremendously. While the
quality demanded by different individual subscribers may vary, in the
aggregate it should reflect not only the costs that subscribers are
willing to bear but the probability of needing medical attention as
well. The prospects of one day needing unexpected treatment is
likely sufficient to spur healthy subscribers toward demanding
quality. If, on the other hand, healthy subscribers choose not to bear
the additional costs of higher quality, different MCO markets
reflecting consumer preference regarding cost and quality will
develop.
IV. ALTERNATIVE ANTITRUST POLICIES TO "LEVEL THE PLAYING
FIELD"
Operating under the assumption that an unfettered antitrust
exemption for physician unions may be an unsatisfactory resolution
to the current provider-MCO crisis, this Section proposes two
alternatives to such legislation. The first alternative proposes a legal
countervailing force by which physicians might negotiate collectively
with MCOs. The second alternative involves antitrust regulation of
the potential monopsony power of MCOs.
86. This chain of events is further described in Pitofsky, supra note 78.
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A. Formation of Physician Network Joint Ventures (PNJVs) in
Accordance with DOJ/FTC Guidelines
The 1996 DOJ/FTC Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy
in Health Care87 (the Statements) suggest an alternative to
unionization for physicians wishing to bargain collectively for MCO
contracts without running afoul of antitrust laws. The Statements
define a PNJV88 as a "physician-controlled venture in which the
network's physician participants collectively agree on prices or price-
related terms and jointly market their services. ' 89  The PNJV,
therefore, presents a vehicle by which physicians might legally join
forces to negotiate price and other terms with MCOs. Absent
extraordinary circumstances, the DOJ and FTC will not challenge
PNJVs in which participants share substantial financial risk and do
not exceed certain "antitrust safety zones" described below ° PNJV
participants not in compliance with the risk sharing or safety zone
requirements may be challenged by the FTC or DOJ under either a
per se approach 91 or a rule of reason analysis.Y
1. Framework for the Antitrust Analysis of PNJVs
Compliance with "antitrust safety zone" guidelines is a
conservative, yet nearly certain method for PNJVs to avoid antitrust
scrutiny. As a threshold matter, PNJV participants "must share
substantial financial risk in providing all the services that are jointly
priced through the network" to fall within the safety zone.93 How-
ever, further prerequisites for "antitrust safety zone" qualification
differ with respect to the exclusivity of a PNJV for its constituent
members. To qualify for the safety zone, an exclusive PNJV must not
constitute more than twenty percent of the "physicians in each
physician specialty... who practice in the relevant geographic
87. See DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE AND FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, STATEMENTS OF
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT POLICY IN HEALTH CARE (1996) [hereinafter STATEMENTS].
88. While many PNJVs are established to compete directly with MCOs (often referred to as
preferred provider organizations ("PPOs")), this Note will not discuss such ventures. Indeed,
PPOs compete horizontally with MCOs insofar as they offer an alternative health care financing
option. Instead, this Note limits its focus to PNJVs organized for the purpose of collectively
negotiating price terms in a vertical relationship vis-a-vis the MCOs.
89. STATEMENTS, supra note 87, at 20,814.
90. Id. at 20,815-16.
91. See id. at 20,821.
92. See id. at 20,818.
93. Id. at 20,815-16.
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market." 94 A nonexclusive PNJV, however, must not constitute more
than thirty percent of the same market group.95
PNJVs that either fail to share substantial financial risk or
include a higher percentage of physicians than allowed by the
"antitrust safety zone" may be lawful under a rule of reason analysis
nonetheless. 96  Indeed, "if the physicians' integration through the
network is likely to produce significant efficiencies that benefit
consumers, and any [agreements that would otherwise be per se
illegal] are reasonably necessary to realize those efficiencies," then
rule of reason analysis will be applied. 97  On the other hand,
arrangements among physicians that merely seek to impede
competitive forces in the market and do not create procompetitive
efficiencies will be treated as "unlawful conspiracies or cartels" and
considered per se illegal.98 Although a case-by-case factual inquiry
ultimately must determine whether the rule of reason analysis or per
se approach applies, the Statements list several indicia of naked
anticompetitive conduct.99  To further facilitate the creation of
compliant PNJVs, the DOJ and FTC each provide a service whereby
physicians contemplating a PNJV may solicit an opinion regarding
the legality of potential joint ventures.1°°
The rule of reason analysis, as applied to PNJVs, is basically a
four step process. First, the relevant geographic and product market
is defined by considering all reasonably available substitutes for a
PNJV's services. 10 1 Second, the anticompetitive potential of a PNJV
to raise prices or impede other networks is evaluated.1 12  Third, the
procompetitive efficiencies created by a PNJV are assessed and
94. Id. at 20,815.
95. See id.
96. For examples of PNJVs outside of the safety zone that have been approved by the DOJ
and FTC, see id. at 20,814 n.24 (citing five agency letters approving nonexclusive PNJVs with
physician participation in excess of the thirty percent safety zone threshold).
97. Id. at 20,817.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 20,817-18 (listing as factors justifying per se treatment: statements evidencing
anticompetitive purpose; a recent history of collusion in the market; obvious anticompetitive
structural characteristics; the absence of efficiency-creating mechanisms; the presence of
anticompetitive collateral agreements; and the failure to provide mechanisms to mitigate
anticompetitive "spillover" effects outside of the network).
100. See Pilot Business Review Program, 58 Fed. Reg. 6132 (1993) (outlining the DOJ's
expedited business review procedure); FTC General Procedures, 16 C.F.R. §§ 1.1-1.4 (1993)
(explaining the FTC's advisory opinion procedure).
101. See STATEMENTS, supra note 87, at 20,818.
102. See id. at 20,818-19.
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balanced against any anticompetitive effects.103 Fourth, the effect on
competition of any collateral agreements made among physician
participants is determined. 104
2. Advantages of PNJVs As an Alternative to Unionization
PNJVs present a more economically satisfying alternative to
physician unions precisely because of the financial risk-sharing
requirement. By sharing financial risk, PNJV participants achieve
economic integration. Sufficient economic integration precludes a
Sherman Act section 1 violation by virtue of the U.S. Supreme
Court's rejection of the "intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine" in
Copperweld Corp. v. Independence Tube Corp.10 5 and its progeny.
Indeed, by forming "single entities" for the purposes of antitrust
analysis, physicians escape section 1 scrutiny.
103. See id. at 20,819.
104. See id.
105. 467 U.S. 752 (1984). The facts of Copperweld indicate that in conjunction with
Copperweld's purchase of wholly owned subsidiary, Regal Tube, from Lear Siegler, these three
parties entered into an agreement not to compete. See id. at 756. After the acquisition,
however, a former vice president/general manager of Regal set up respondent business in direct
competition and began taking orders. See id. Despite the advice of counsel that respondent
would not be bound by the covenant not to compete, petitioners Copperweld and Regal sent
out letters to prospective purchasers, suppliers, financial institutions, and real estate firms
indicating that respondent was conducting business in violation of the covenant not to compete.
See id. at 756-57. When respondent lost a contract to supply a tubing mill, it sued, alleging that
Copperweld and its subsidiary, Regal, had conspired to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of
the Sherman Act. See id. at 757-58. Reversing the lower court decision for the respondent, the
Supreme Court addressed the narrow question of "whether a parent and its wholly owned
subsidiary are capable of conspiring in violation of § 1 of the Sherman Act." See id. at 767. The
Court reasoned that a "basic distinction between concerted and independent action" existed
within the Sherman Act. Id. (quoting Monsanto Co. v. Spray-Rite Serv. Corp., 465 U.S. 752, 761
(1984)). Accordingly, section 1 "reaches unreasonable restraints of trade effected by a
'contract, combination.., or conspiracy' between separate entities"; whereas section 2 governs
the threats of single firm monopolization. See id. at 767-68. Viewing "the coordinated activity
of a parent and its wholly owned subsidiary" as "that of a single enterprise for purposes of § 1 of
the Sherman Act," the Court held that a section 1 conspiracy between Copperweld and its
subsidiary, Regal was impossible. See id. at 771, 777.
While the parent-subsidiary relationship in Copperweld may be distinguishable from the
associations typically formed by groups of physicians, the basic premise that constituents of
economically integrated ventures cannot conspire in violation of section 1 is applicable. Since
Copperweld, this rationale has been extended to protect the concerted actions of parent
corporations and partially owned subsidiaries; hospital trustees and staff peer reviewers; and
other parties of varying relationships. See, e.g., Oksanen v. Page Mem'l Hosp., 945 F.2d 696 (4th
Cir. 1991) (holding that physician peer reviews conducted by staff physicians were an integral
part of hospital management and, as such, immune from section 1 inquiry); Novatel Comm. v.
Cellular Tel. Supply, No. C85-2674A (N.D. Ga. Dec. 23, 1986) (holding parent corporation
incapable of conspiring in violation of section 1 with subsidiary in which it had at least fifty-one
percent ownership interest). For an overview of subsequent developments in the demise of the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine, see SULLIVAN & HARRISON, supra note 59, at 197-214.
There is little doubt that a PNJV formed in accordance with the Statements would be
sufficiently integrated to fall into the Copperweld rationale, as well.
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In addition to reconciling potential conflicts with section 1 of the
Sherman Act, the PNJV method of physician organization surpasses
the unionization option by creating efficiencies. Certain procom-
petitive efficiencies created by economic integration provide
incidental benefits to the PNJV option. By combining expertise,
investment capital, and business assets, physicians may be able to
provide medical services together that no single physician could
provide independently. 10 6  Further, where physicians are highly
competitive these advantages ultimately could afford consumers
lower prices and higher quality care. 107
3. Criticisms of PNJVs As an Alternative to Unionization
Three significant criticisms of PNJVs as an alternative to
physician unionization include impracticality, ineffectiveness, and
unfair treatment by the agencies. First, a PNJV may not be a
practical solution for all physicians. The requirement of economic
integration necessitates bureaucratic-like arrangements to ensure
sufficient risk sharing.108 The accompanying financial burdens of legal
representation and infrastructure modification are too onerous
according to some physicians. 10 9 Further, by sharing risk with partners
physicians may lose the very autonomy they seek to preserve by
unionizing. Specifically, physicians complain that PNJV incentives to
reduce or limit care would place participating physicians in ethically
compromising positions.1 0 Upon more careful reflection, however,
these practical criticisms lose force. Complaints regarding the
financial burden of increased bureaucracy and infrastructure ignore
the fact that MCOs must bear similar costs in expanding the breadth
106. For an explanation of the procompetitive advantages of joint ventures, see SULLIVAN
& HARRISON, supra note 59, at 149 (citing In re Brunswick Corp., 94 F.T.C. 1174, 1265 (1979),
affd sub nor. Yamaha Motor Co. v. FC, 657 F.2d 971 (2d Cir. 1981)).
By joining skills, spreading risks, achieving certain economies of scale, and reducing
transaction costs, the joint firm may be more efficient and willing to undertake
research or production. "The combined capital, assets, or know-how of two companies
may facilitate entry into new markets and thereby enhance competition, or may create
efficiencies or new productive capacity unachievable by either alone."
Id.
107. See STATEMENTS, supra note 87, at 28 (arguing that competition-as a motivation for
firms to lower prices, reduce costs, and provide higher quality-facilitates pro-consumer effi-
ciencies).
108. See id. at 24 (noting agreements that provide for "capitated" rates-a system of
significant financial incentives for members, or a system of mixing services for complex
treatments-as acceptable models for sharing financial risk).
109. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 168 (statement of the AMA).
110. See id.
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of the services they offer. Indeed, such costs are the inevitable costs
of expansion, and physicians' inability to bear them only demon-
strates that they are not competitive vis-A-vis MCOs. Criticisms about
incentives to limit care do not acknowledge the existence of similar
incentives in the status quo. This perceived "disadvantage" of
forming a PNJV would otherwise exist even if the physician were to
contract directly with an MCO. In truth, such incentives may reflect a
consumer plea for lower costs.
Second, PNJVs may be ineffective in addressing the specific
concerns of physician unionization proponents. The effectiveness of
PNJVs may be doubted simply because the option exists in the status
quo, yet physician frustration over MCOs is rampant nonetheless.
However, this argument prematurely assumes that PNJVs have been
and are, in fact, utilized by physicians. Further, although many phy-
sicians argue that the DOJ and FTC are unfair in their enforcement
of antitrust laws against physician mergers,11' the agencies maintain
that "it is not their intent to treat [PNJVs] either more strictly or
more leniently than joint ventures in other industries."1
2
4. Summary of PNJVs As an Alternative to Unionization
Despite criticisms of PNJVs, the potential advantages created by
joint ventures would outweigh any disadvantage. By forming new
PNJVs, physicians could increase their bargaining power vis-A-vis
managed care without implicating antitrust law and increase the
quality of health care through procompetitive efficiencies. Accord-
ingly, the Statements provide an acceptable alternative to unioni-
zation through the use of the PNJV.
B. Aggressively Police the Monopsony Power of MCOs
Another strategy for preventing unlevel playing fields in the
health care provider-MCO relationship wholly abandons the premise
that physicians need a countervailing negotiating force. An antitrust
enforcement policy to address MCO monopsony power could foster
negotiating parity without endorsing the forms of collusion that give
rise to concerns of section 1 violations.
Monopsony is defined as "the structural condition of there being
111. See id. ("[T]he agencies' 1996 Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health
Care reflect a bias against physicians and in favor of payers.").
112. STATEMENTS, supra note 87, at 25.
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a single buyer of a well-specified good or service. 11 3  Monopsony
power refers to a buyer's ability or power to depress the price of a
good or service below competitive levels. 114 While a monopolist may
raise prices above its marginal cost by decreasing the supply of a
product or service, a monopsonist may depress prices through its
control over the demand for a product or service.
Like monopoly power, monopsony power may develop as a
result of either collusion among multiple firms (collusive monopsony)
or the concentration of power in a single firm (monopsonization).5
Furthermore, antitrust enforcement of these distinct monopsonistic
circumstances differs. Collusive monopsonies, like collusion of
multiple seller firms, may be regulated under section 1 of the
Sherman Act. Single firm monopsonists debatably may be subject to
scrutiny under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Finally, potential
monopsonists may be prevented through the implementation of
merger guidelines and pre-merger reporting requirements.
1. Framework for the Antitrust Analysis of MCO Monopsony
That collusive monopsonists may be subject to liability under
Sherman Act section 1 is clearly precedented. Insofar as confeder-
ations of independent buyer firms stabilize or fix prices through their
conduct, they are liable to the same extent as their seller firm
counterparts. In Mandeville Island Farms v. American Crystal Sugar
Co.,116 the Supreme Court considered whether a group of California
sugar refiners could agree among themselves on a uniform price to
pay for California sugar beets.117 Reversing the court of appeals'
affirmation of a dismissal for failure to state a claim, the Court found
that respondents' agreement was "the sort of combination con-
demned by the Act, even though the price-fixing was by pur-
113. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 57, at 3.
114. See id. at 27.
115. See id. at 25-34.
116. 334 U.S. 219 (1947).
117. See id. at 221 (explaining that sugar refiners used beets as input for their refining
process). The facts indicate that petitioner-sugar beet farmers operated their business in a
relatively remote part of northern California. See id. at 222. This remote location, along with
the special circumstances that beets may not be transported long distances or stored effectively,
limited the universe of buyers to whom petitioners could sell their beets. See id. at 222 & n.2. In
abuse of this monopsonistic condition, respondents (the only three sugar refiners to whom
petitioners could profitably sell) entered into an agreement to fix prices on sugar beets. See id.
at 223 (noting that respondents fixed prices by adopting identical form contracts and computing
beet prices on the average net returns of all three rather than each individually).
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chasers.""1 ' This language reflects the general principle that the
section 1 prohibition on contracts, combinations, and conspiracies in
restraint of trade applies equally to buyers and sellers.
While the regulation of collusive monopsonies is straightforward
in its application of section 1 jurisprudence to purchaser firms, the
regulation of existing single-firm monopsonists is more tenuous. As a
structural condition alone, monopsony (like monopoly) is not
forbidden by section 2 of the Sherman Act.119  Indeed, natural
monopsonies often form in markets where a single purchaser creates
efficiencies due to economies of scale.120 In the case of MCOs, for
example, it is certainly more efficient for subscribers to purchase
health care services jointly rather than individually. Destruction of
these monopsonistic powers could lead to inefficiencies and cause
"welfare losses.' 12' Furthermore, much debate exists over whether or
not the use of monopsony power by a single firm to lower prices
should constitute an antitrust violation.122
Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. ,123 stands for the
proposition that monopsony pricing alone does not implicate antitrust
liability. In Kartell, the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit
reversed a district court finding that petitioner Blue Shield of
Massachusetts (Blue Shield) had violated antitrust law by banning
balance billing.124  Kartell involved the complaints of a group of
independent Massachusetts physicians alleging that Blue Shield's ban
on balance billing illegally depressed health care service prices.Y2
Analogizing Blue Shield's action to monopoly pricing, the court held
that monopsony pricing alone did not violate antitrust law. 126
Writing for the court, then-Judge Breyer suggested three policy
considerations to bolster this result. First, he indicated that given the
118. Id. at 235 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
119. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 57, at 63.
120. See id.
121. Id.
122. See BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 57, at 146 ("[The question of whether a seller to a
monopsony [may] challenge a monopsonist buyer on the basis of the prices received is only of
theoretical interest."); Roger D. Blair & Jeffrey L. Harrison, Cooperative Buying, Monopsony
Power, and Antitrust Policy, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 331, 348 (1992) (referring to the inability of
antitrust law to address single firm monopsony price setting as a structural dilemma).
123. 749 F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 471 U.S. 1029 (1985).
124. See id. at 922.
125. See id. at 929.
126. See id. at 927 (citing P. AREEDA, ANTrRUST LAW § 710 (Supp. 1982) and Berkey




Sherman Act's consumer protection policy "courts at least should be
cautious-reluctant to condemn too speedily-an arrangement that,
on its face, appears to bring low price benefits to the consumer. 127
Second, he urged "judicial hesitancy" in considering the complex
nature of medical costs. 28 Finally, he noted that antitrust scrutiny
would be inappropriate, taking into account the regulatory role that
states play in setting prices.
129
In contrast to Kartell's absolute refusal to condemn single-firm
monopsony price-setting, Ball Memorial Hospital, Inc. v. Mutual
Hospital Insurance, Inc.,130 suggests that similar conduct may fall
within the ambit of Sherman Act section 2 if accompanied by
anticompetitive intent. In Ball Memorial, the Court of Appeals for
the Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of an
injunction proposed by a group of Indiana hospitals to stop Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Indiana ("BC&BS") from offering a PPO to
its customers. 3' The hospitals argued that the PPO would exploit
BC&BS's monopsony power to depress health care service prices.1 32
Applying a rule of reason analysis, the court held that defendants
lacked the requisite market power and anticompetitive intent to give
rise to antitrust liability.133 While Ball Memorial denied the specific
injunction requested, critics suggest that by inquiring into the
monopsonist's intent, the court left open a possibility of antitrust
liability for single firm monopsonistic price setting. 34
In addition to this legal development, Kartell's policy assump-
tions have also been criticized. Then-Judge Breyer's emphasis on the
importance of low prices for medical care is significantly undercut by
the argument that lower prices may stifle development and inno-
vation. Indeed, when health care prices are driven lower by MCO
monopsony power, providers have less incentive to develop new and
127. Id. at 930-31 (citations omitted).
128. Id. at 931.
129. See id.
130. 784 F.2d 1325 (7th Cir. 1986).
131. See id. at 1346.
132. See id. at 1332.
133. See id. at 1337-40.
134. See, e.g., Andrew Ruskin, Unbridled Managed Care: When Consumers Experience
Antitrust Welfare Loss from Exclusionary Contracts Between HMO Insurers and Health Care
Providers, 6 HEALTH MATRIX 391, 458 (1996) ("Although ultimately the [Ball Memorial] court
found no antitrust violation, its situation-specific analysis of the elements that contribute to
monopsonistic injury might guide other courts to be similarly thorough in their analyses when
considering the effects of an exclusionary restraint on providers.").
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efficient medical procedures.'35 Ostensibly, the district court recog-
nized this argument in rendering its opinion of the case. 136 Further,
critics suggest that MCOs similar to the one involved in Kartell may
reduce the overall quality of health care by discouraging the provision
of certain services on the basis of cost.
137
Regardless of the legality of single-firm price control, much case
law supports the proposition that a violation of antitrust law may be
found where a monopsonist uses its power to acquire nonprice
advantages. The seminal case in this arena is United States v.
Griffith.13 8 Griffith involved an action against four affiliated corpora-
tions that operated movie theaters in Oklahoma, Texas, and New
Mexico.139 The facts indicate that these corporations used a common
agent to negotiate movie distributions.1 40 Through the use of this
agent, the corporations were able to control the demand for movie
distributions in certain towns. 4' The complaint alleged that monop-
sony power in some towns was used to negotiate distribution
contracts that favored the corporations' operations in other towns. 142
The Supreme Court reversed the lower court's dismissal, reasoning
that the corporations attempted to use one monopoly power "to
beget" another.1 43
Critics distinguish Griffith and cases like it from cases of pure
monopsonistic pricing by noting that they involve procurement of
''exclusive access to some input that would then result in an
advantage for the firm as a seller."'44 Such criticism suggests that, to
the extent MCO contracts seek to gain "exclusive access" to physician
services, MCOs may fall within the confines of the Griffith decision.
If exclusive access to physicians results in selling advantages, single-
firm monopsonist MCOs may be subject to section 2 liability under a
Griffith analysis.
135. See H.E. Frech III, Monopoly in Health Insurance: The Economics of Kartell v. Blue
Shield of Massachusetts, in HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF HOS-
PITALS AND HEALTH INSURANCE 317-18 (H.E. Frech III ed., 1988).
136. See Kartell v. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc., 582 F. Supp. 734, 752-53 (D. Mass.
1984) (noting that the ban on billing hindered the use of a safer, innovative colonoscopy
procedure).
137. See Frech, supra note 135, at 318-19.
138. 334 U.S. 100 (1948).
139. See id. at 101-02.
140. See id. at 102.
141. See id.
142. See id. at 102-04.
143. Id. at 108.
144. BLAIR & HARRISON, supra note 57, at 32 (emphasis added).
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Finally, as suggested above, potential monopsony may be
avoided through the application of laws restricting mergers. Mergers
of purchasing firms present an antitrust threat by consolidating
market power.145 Critics suggest that section 7 of the Clayton Act
would apply equally to both sellers and buyers.1 46 Presumably, by
promulgating guidelines that specifically addressed the merger of
MCOs, the agencies could adequately prevent future monopsonies.
2. The Current Monopsony Threat of MCOs
Many proponents of physician unionization complain that MCOs
enjoy a monopsony power because of their high market concen-
tration. 147 Indeed, one study indicates that the five largest insurers
had at least fifty percent share of the relevant market in twenty-three
of twenty-five states examined and over seventy percent share of the
relevant market in sixteen of those states. 48 Furthermore, in eleven
of the twenty-five states examined, the Herfindahl/Hirschman index
of market concentration for health plans exceeded 1800149 (the level at
which FTC/DOJ Horizontal Merger Guidelines consider a market
"highly concentrated" 50). As physicians thus market their services to
fewer and fewer MCO "buyers," 5 ' the potential for either collusive
monopsony or outright monopsonization increases. To make matters
worse, physician unionization proponents allege that their complaints
to the agencies about MCO mergers and the potential for
monopsonization have fallen on deaf ears. 52
Opponents of physician unionization respond that health plans
lack monopsony power for two reasons. First, they assert that since
MCO reimbursements account for a minority of average physician
income,153 it is "virtually impossible" for a single firm to represent a
145. See id. at 23.
146. See id.
147. In fact, the findings preceding House Bill 1304 take note of changes in the health care
industry that have raised MCO market concentration. See H.R. 1304, 106th Cong. § 2(2) (2000).
148. See Hearings, supra note 35, at 155 (statement of the AMA).
149. See id.
150. DEP'T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM'N, 1997 MERGER GUIDELINES (1997).
151. See Abate, supra note 5, at Cl (noting that eighteen major California HMOs have
consolidated into six firms since 1990).
15Z See Hearings, supra note 35, at 159 (statement of the AMA) ("[T]he agencies' 1996
Statements of Antitrust Enforcement Policy in Health Care reflect a bias against physicians and
in favor of payers. None of the statements address the market power of managed care
companies, collusion among managed care companies, or anticompetitive mergers among
managed care companies. All nine Statements address [the] activities of physicians and other
health care providers.").
153. See Written Testimony of the Antitrust Coalition for Consumer Choice in Health Care
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monopsonist's share of physician revenues. 154 Second, opponents
claim that health care markets are not as highly concentrated as
others suggest. Indeed, Interstudy's MSA Profiles, 1998 suggests that
in most areas enrollees in any one HMO account for a small portion
of total populations.
1 55
Allegations of MCO monopsony may also be deflated in light of
the current glut of physicians in practice. In recent years, the number
of physicians per capita has increased substantially. 156  Simple
economics suggests that as this supply has increased, the respective
demand for services has declined. If statistics showing an over supply
of physicians are accurate, a depression in prices may be the result of
basic economics rather than a monopsonistic MCO force.
Weighing the legitimacy of competing statistics on MCO
monopsony power would be a moot point. Were the FTC or DOJ to
pursue the regulation of any monopsony power, information about
MCO concentration in a particularly relevant market would need to
be determined before a tribunal on a case-by-case basis.157 Neverthe-
less, some conclusions may be drawn from the nature of the data
presented. Principally, the statistics offered by opponents of phy-
sician unionization focus only on the probability of monopsony by
single firms, thereby ignoring the possibility of a collusive monopsony
among MCOs. On the other hand, the proponents of physician
unionization point to no evidence of collusion among MCOs that
would give rise to a violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
3. Summary of Policing MCO Monopsony Power As an Alternative
to Physician Unionization
Monopsony powers can create serious market distortions by
controlling the demand for a product or service. Whether or not
monopsony powers currently exist within the MCO industry has been
a topic of intense debate. However, to the extent that such power
Opposing H.R. 1304 (visited June 22, 2000) <http://www.healthantitrust.org/writtentesti-
mony.htm> (noting that average physician incomes in 1998 were comprised of 42.8% private
insurance, 12% Medicaid, 28.6% Medicare, and 12.2% paying patients).
154. Id.
155. See id.
156. See supra notes 40-44 and accompanying text.
157. For a framework for analyzing the monopsonistic power of MCOs, see Ruskin, supra
note 134, at 444-51. Ruskin cites three aspects of MCO monopsony: MCOs consume a
significant amount of a provider's service, few non-MCO health care financing options exist in
the relevant market, and barriers to entry for such non-MCO financing arrangements exist. See
id. at 449.
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does exist, Sherman Act sections 1 and 2 and pre-merger scrutiny may
provide adequate mechanisms for regulation. An agency enforcement
policy implementing these provisions could correct any existing
market distortions and deter potential abuses of monopsony power.
At a minimum, such an express policy could quell tension among
physicians criticizing the agencies of bias.
The chief difficulty with pursuing such a plan is summarized in
the policy considerations of Kartell.158 Practically speaking, if MCOs
are using monopsony power to depress prices, there are facially
beneficial consequences for consumers. Although resulting threats to
the quality of health care services would not be in the consumers' best
interest, increased prices might very well be the "welfare losses"
against which MCO monopsony powers protect. Establishing the
Griffith nonprice advantages procured by MCO monopsonists might
be difficult. Accordingly, increased antitrust scrutiny might be met
with the "judicial hesitancy" exhibited in Kartell.
CONCLUSION
The growth of managed care in the U.S. has changed not only the
way patients receive and pay for their health care, but also the way
physicians conduct their practices. Third party payers now present
physicians with an organized purchasing front that forces them to
compete not only on the basis of quality but on price as well. At the
same time, physician earnings have slowed substantially. While
physicians argue that the MCO prerogative of "cost containment" has
gutted their professional autonomy and threatened the quality of
their services, MCOs respond that such frustrations, in fact, are
rooted in physicians' financial self-interest. Physicians argue that
MCO negotiating power bullies them into veritable "contracts of
adhesion" 159 vis-A-vis managed care. MCOs respond that by consoli-
dating buying power they actually create systems that improve the
quality of health care. Drops in physician earnings, they maintain, are
attributable to freer competition in the market and an over supply of
physicians per capita.
As this debate has garnered public attention, many theories of
resolution have been suggested. The latest proposal, though not
unprecedented, is a system of physician unions to negotiate col-
158. See supra notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
159. Little, supra note 28, at 1397.
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lectively with MCOs. Acquiring the support of the AMA and
numerous legislators, the physician unionization movement has
conceived a specific legislative remedy to exempt physician unions
from antitrust liability. H.R. 1304, though surely well intentioned,
furthers bad antitrust policy for two reasons. First, the premise that a
negotiating disparity must be offset with a countervailing force is
flawed. The old adage that "two wrongs do not make a right"
explains why government should not answer one alleged restraint on
free competition by endorsing another. Second, the suggestion that
the quality of health care hangs in the balance of the legislation is
misguided. In fact, antitrust jurisprudence has long recognized that
competition (not its prevention) yields the highest quality goods and
services.
Two more palatable alternatives include the increased use of
legal PNJVs and an agency enforcement policy aimed at monitoring
and regulating MCO monopsonies. These alternatives may provide
physicians with the "level playing field" they have demanded while
remaining true to the antitrust premise that competition is the best
form of resource allocation in a free market.
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